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Abstract
Campaign priming is generally assumed to function through the activation of memory
content. By focusing on specific issues or issue aspects, campaigns render correspond-
ing cognitive concepts more accessible and hence influence which concepts are likely
to be used in subsequent evaluation processes. Thus, priming is mainly understood as
a cognitive process. In the present study we investigate the impact of campaign-
induced emotions on opinion formation. We argue that emotions may activate cogni-
tive content which may in turn influence political judgments. Our analyses support
the hypothesis that political campaigns may influence public opinion not only through
cognitive priming but also through affective priming.
In their seminal work on priming, Iyengar and Kinder (1987) argued that ‘‘by
priming certain aspects of national life while ignoring others, television news
sets the terms by which political judgments are rendered and political choices
made’’ (p. 4). Based on Iyengar and Kinder’s conceptual groundwork, many
studies have explored the effects of political campaigns on opinion formation
and voting (e.g., Bartels, 2006; de Vreese, 2004; Druckman, 2004). In this line
of research, priming is generally assumed to function through the activation of
memory content. By focusing on specific issues or issue aspects, political
campaigns render corresponding cognitive concepts more accessible and
hence influence which concepts are likely to be used in subsequent evaluation
processes (e.g., Iyengar, 1990; Ju, 2005; Krosnick & Kinder, 1990). Thus,
priming is mainly understood as a cognitive process.
All correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Rinaldo Ku¨hne, IPMZ – Institute of Mass
Communication and Media Research, University of Zu¨rich, Andreasstrasse 15, CH-8050 Zu¨rich,
Switzerland. E-mail: r.kuehne@ipmz.uzh.ch
Rarely are political campaigns solely about issues and arguments though. As
documented by content analytic studies (e.g., De Castella, McGarty, &
Musgrove, 2009; Jerit, 2004), emotions are in fact a pervasive element of political
communication used by political candidates and parties to win the attention
and approval of the public. The attitudinal ramifications of emotional appeals
in political campaigns are yet barely incorporated in the classical
conceptualizations of campaign effects (i.e., the priming and framing perspective).
We thus propose an extension of the priming approach formulated by
Iyengar and Kinder (1987), such that campaigns can also indirectly enhance
the attitudinal importance of cognitions by eliciting emotions which, in turn,
raise the importance of certain cognitions in the attitude formation process. In
doing so, we bear on the work of Bower (1981) who has pointed out that
memory content may not only be activated by the exposure to semantic in-
formation but also by individuals’ affective states. For example, good moods
and positive emotions can increase the accessibility of positively valenced
memory content. It is therefore suggestive to complement the cognitive priming
approach with affective priming effects (Bower, 1981; Forgas, 1995): Political
campaigns may influence the accessibility of cognitions not only by emphasizing
certain aspects of the debated issues (e.g., Matthes, 2008). They may also in-
fluence accessibility of arguments by evoking issue-related affect and, by doing
so, they have an impact on subsequent evaluations of the issue. Affective prim-
ing effects are well established in social psychology and have been demonstrated
repeatedly in experimental studies (cf. Forgas, 1995). However, their long-term
effects during political campaigns have yet to be accounted for.
Below, we first provide a concise literature review on the role of emotions in
political thinking and behavior. We discuss the different paths of affective influ-
ence on political judgment and argue that affective priming is a particularly
useful approach to explain the interactive effects of emotions and political cog-
nitions. We then turn to the illustration of the affective priming approach as an
extension of the classical cognitive priming concept. Based on the associative
network model of memory (e.g., Collins & Loftus, 1975), we will argue that
affective priming can be understood as an alternative form of an activation im-
pulse within the cognitive network that renders certain memory content more
accessible. Finally, we present the results of our analyses which investigated the
impact of emotions during a political campaign in Switzerland. The results sup-
port the direct and interactive effects of emotions on political judgments. The
implications of these emotional effects of political campaigns are discussed.
The Emotional Underpinnings of Political Decision Making
Since the opening of the psychological black box in the mid 20th century,
campaign research has essentially focused on cognitive processes. Under the
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influence of the rapid developments in information technology and the emer-
gence of computers, the metaphor of the ‘‘information processor’’ has
often been used to describe individuals and their judgment processes. As
LeDoux (1999) pointed out, this metaphor supported a research program
that was focused rather on cognitions than on emotions, as the latter were
considered illogical and thus not applicable to models of purposeful reasoning.
Affect was, for the most part, seen as a simple evaluation resulting from the
cognitive assessment of an object, whereas emotional judgment processes were
barely considered (Zajonc, 1980). Similarly, research in the realm of political
decision making had a predominantly cognitive perspective (Way & Masters,
1996) and was interested in phenomena like stereotyping, cognitive heuristics,
or issue voting.
Recently, interest in emotional influences on political decision making
has picked up. In the course of Zajonc’s (1980) criticism of the predomin-
ant cognitive focus of psychology, it has been argued that political cognition
is heavily influenced by affective processes. ‘‘Primacy of affect’’ proponents
have even claimed the prevalence of emotions within processes of political
opinion formation (cf. Lodge & Taber, 2005). Neuroscientific findings
demonstrate that affective processes can also impact decision making in the
absence of conscious cognition (LeDoux, 1999; McDermott, 2004). It is there-
fore useful to conceptualize political information processing as consisting of
two distinct entities, the affective and the cognitive, which typically (but not
necessarily) interact when a political evaluation is fabricated (Way & Masters,
1996).
Compared to the multitude of findings on the cognitive impact of
campaigns, the empirical findings about emotional effects on political judg-
ment are still scarce. Since the 1980s, a first line of research has focused the
direct effects of emotion on evaluations of politicians and political issues.
Abelson and colleagues (Abelson, Kinder, Peters, & Fiske 1982) were
among the first researchers who examined the relationship between affect
and evaluations of political candidates. They found that positive and negative
affect form constructs that are independent of cognitions (e.g., trait ratings
of candidates). Furthermore, they demonstrated that positive and negative
emotions predict thermometer ratings of presidential candidates. As expected,
positive emotions towards a candidate had a positive impact on his or
her global evaluation while negative emotions were detrimental to the
evaluation.
The distinctness of affective influences on political judgment has been
corroborated in multiple studies which provided evidence that affect does not
only influences the evaluation of political candidates (Ottati, Steenbergen, &
Riggle, 1992), but also the assessment of presidential and governmental perform-
ance (Conover & Feldman, 1986), voting intention (Granberg & Brown, 1989),
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evaluations of political issues like the death penalty (Haddock & Zanna, 1998)
or abortion (Breckler & Wiggins, 1991), as well as attitudes towards social groups
(Haddock, Zanna, & Esses, 1993) and political institutions (Rahn, 2000).
This first line of research has primarily been interested in demonstrating
that emotions have a genuine influence on political judgments and that this
effect is distinct from the influence of cognition, thus explaining additional
variance of political opinions. The focus on the direct effects of emotions
and cognition can hence be understood as a reaction to the predominantly
cognitive research tradition that did not grant emotions a place within its the-
oretical framework. Although these studies have produced many insightful
findings, the focus on direct emotional effects turned out to have a downside:
It led to a narrowed view of the attitudinal influences of emotions and cogni-
tions because cognitive and affective processes were—implicitly or explicitly—
considered to operate independently. This is reflected in the theoretical models
that were applied: Affective influences were explained by the affect as infor-
mation concept (e.g., Granberg & Brown, 1989; Rahn, 2000) or the multi-
component model of attitudes (e.g., Haddock & Zanna, 1998; Ottati et al.,
1992), which both conceptualize cognition and emotion as independent pre-
dictors of political judgments. As current psychological research points out,
however, cognition and emotion typically interact in processes of decision
making (e.g., Damasio, 1994; LeDoux, 1999). Recent studies in the field of
public opinion have expanded their focus to the interactive effects of emotion
and cognition. Marcus and MacKuen (1993) were among the first who analyzed
the interplay of affect and cognition during political campaigns. They postu-
lated that voters alternate between a thorough analysis of electoral information
and a mere reliance on party affiliation, depending on the experience of en-
thusiasm or fear during presidential campaigns. According to their affective
intelligence approach, enthusiasm signals to the individual that no particular
effort has to be expended as everything is going well. Enthusiastic individuals
are hence likely to depend on previously learned routines and preferences like
their party affiliation and ideologies. Fear, on the contrary, is triggered when
the context is unfamiliar or the outcomes are uncertain; it instructs individuals
to pay careful attention to the political events as the novelty of the situation
does not allow for the use of routine procedures. Emotions thus function as a
swift indicator for the cognitive effort that should be expended and provide the
citizen with ‘‘affective intelligence’’. Analyses based on the affective intelligence
approach showed that enthusiasm did increase support of the own candidate.
Fear was, on the other hand, not directly related to voting preference, but
moderated the effect of partisanship on voting preference (Marcus &
MacKuen, 1993). More precisely, intense fear reduced the reliance on the
party heuristic. Marcus and MacKuen showed thus that emotions can both
directly enter political judgments and have an indirect impact by influencing
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the processing of information. Corroboration for the influences of emotion on
political cognition comes mainly from survey studies (e.g., Sniderman, Brody,
& Tetlock, 1991) as well as experimental designs (e.g., Brader, 2005; Civettini
& Redlawsk, 2009).
Overall, the current state of research implies that emotions can impact
political judgments in two different ways. First, citizens can use their emotions
as a piece of information for the evaluation of a politician, a party, or a
proposal. In this vein, cognitive and affective information have an independent
effect on political judgments. Accordingly, the outputs of the cognitive and
the affective systems are considered to be additively integrated into a global
evaluation. Beliefs and feelings should hence be implemented as main effects
into statistical models. Second, affective and cognitive information can act
together during processes of opinion formation. Emotions might, for instance,
influence which cognitive beliefs are accessible and hence more likely to be
used for subsequent judgments. Depending on the theoretical framework, this
interplay of cognition and emotion can be modeled as a moderated or a
mediated relationship (cf. Frazier, Tix, & Barron, 2004). As the affective
priming approach suggests that cognitions and emotions interact during deci-
sion making, we focus on their interactive (i.e., moderated) effects on political
judgments in the remainder of this article.
How Affective Priming Works
In the previous section, it has been argued that emotions can influence pol-
itical judgments in different ways. Affective priming is one possible process
through which emotions can impact political evaluations.
As has already been pointed out, cognitive priming is generally assumed to
function through its influence on the accessibility of cognitive concepts in
memory. The quintessence of this perspective is the idea that individuals
come to a decision not by considering all relevant information (since their
cognitive resources are limited), but only the information that is currently
most accessible in their memory. To explain how political campaigns influ-
ence the accessibility of concepts, researchers have relied on the metaphor of
associative networks (e.g., Price & Tewksbury, 1997). According to this
reasoning, memory consists of a network of concepts which are intertwined
through associative connections (Collins & Loftus, 1975). Given the multitude
of concepts an average person uses every day, associative networks are con-
sidered to be highly complex structures, consisting of uncountable nodes
and associative connections. Therefore, an individual has rarely the chance
to search its memory for all relevant information, but is forced to base his
or her decisions on a selection of knowledge that comes to mind in a given
situation. By priming a specific concept, it is suggested, an activating impulse
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from the concept to the adjacent memory nodes is released that tempor-
arily increases the activation level of these concepts. In subsequent evalu-
ation processes, the primed individual is thus able to link the activated
concepts more easily to the object that is to be assessed. In other words,
the likelihood of the primed concepts to be used as standards of evaluation
is increased.
Bower and Forgas (Bower, 1981; Bower & Forgas, 2001) argue that similar
activation effects can be expected as a consequence of subjective affective
states. To describe the affective influences on memory they expanded the
associative network model with an additional (metaphorical) element: The
emotion nodes. According to this, every individual’s associative network has
two general emotion nodes (one for positive and one for negative affect) that
are each linked to object-specific evaluations and function as gateways for
affective activation impulses. Thus, if an individual experiences an emotional
reaction in response to a given situation, the corresponding emotion node is
activated and acts as the source of an impulse traveling the associative paths to
affectively congruent concepts. That is, positive mood should activate the
general node for positive affect which, in turn, should activate positively
valenced concepts. Conversely, negative mood should result in the activation
of negative information.
We therefore argue that political campaigns entail cognitive and affective
priming effects. The cumulative priming effects of campaigns are composed of
singular priming instances where a recipient is exposed to campaign informa-
tion. At each priming instance, cognitive and affective effects may emerge.
Cognitive priming effects emerge, for instance, when campaign-related news
semantically prime certain issue aspects. In addition, news reports may elicit
affective reactions. According to the appraisal approach to emotion, messages
may cause affective reactions by addressing emotional appeals to the recipient
(e.g., Lazarus, 1991). For instance, an article about unemployment may focus
on the risk of job loss and thereby induce fear. The induced emotions may, in
turn, directly influence citizens’ opinions about a political issue. That is,
positive emotions may support a favorable judgment, whereas negative emo-
tions promote negative verdicts. In addition to these direct effects of emotion,
the affective priming approach specifies ‘‘indirect’’ or interactive effects of
emotion: Campaign-induced affective reactions may indirectly influence polit-
ical judgments by priming affect-congruent cognitions.
It should be noted that the term affective priming has been already applied
by Lodge and Taber (2005) as well as Sheafer (2007). Our conceptualization of
affective priming is compatible with, but more specific than the conception of
Sheafer. According to this, the evaluative tone of media messages about an
issue can color recipients’ evaluations of the issue; a process which he terms
affective pre-priming. Affective priming is then the subsequent step, in which
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these issue evaluations influence the assessment of a politician or a party.
We agree with Sheafer that evaluations contained within media messages in-
fluence the valence of subsequent judgments. However, we would add that
such effects may be mediated by cognitive and/or affective processes as well as
their interaction. Put differently, media messages may influence the recipients’
evaluations through his or her beliefs and/or emotions, as both carry an
evaluative meaning (cf. Eagly & Chaiken, 1993). We specifically reserve the
term affective priming for attitudinal effects which result from the activation
of cognitions through media-induced emotions. Our understanding of affective
priming is hence narrower than that of Sheafer.
The hot cognition hypothesis states that sociopolitical objects are always
affect laden and that evaluations are hence automatically activated and
prime cognitive content whenever an object is encountered (Lodge & Taber,
2005). Lodge and Taber showed that automatic evaluations associated with
political attitude objects can facilitate or inhibit the activation of cognitions.
As they assume that such evaluative effects are a priori affective, they do
not differentiate between the impact of cognitive and emotional evaluative
reactions on judgment formation. We would argue that evaluative reactions
are not necessarily equivalent to emotional reactions (i.e., evaluations may be
cognitive). In contrast to the hot cognition hypothesis, we hence only refer to
affective priming when emotions activate cognitive content. Accordingly, our
research focuses on the interaction of cognitive and emotional evaluations
during judgment formation. In addition, we also chose a different empirical
approach than Lodge and Taber: Instead of conducting laboratory studies we
are interested in documenting affective priming effects outside of the labora-
tory in a naturalistic setting of a political campaign.
Hypotheses
Our study aims at the investigation of the direct and interactive effects of
emotion and cognition in the course of a political campaign. Our first hypoth-
esis postulates that affective reactions (i.e., emotions towards an issue) have a
direct impact on political judgments above and beyond the effect of cognitions
(i.e., cognitive beliefs or arguments in favor of and against an issue). That is,
we are expecting significant main effects of emotions (direct affective impact).
This hypothesis is consistent with the affect as information approach which
posits that affective reactions can directly enter judgments (e.g., Schwarz &
Clore, 1983).
In addition to the direct affective influences, we expect affective priming
effects. Our second hypothesis assumes an interaction between voters’
emotions and cognitions, such that affective states can influence the avail-
ability of affect-congruent cognitive content during attitude formation
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(affective priming or interactive affective impact). That is, positive emotions
should enhance the impact of positively valenced arguments (i.e.,
pro-arguments focusing the beneficial consequences of the proposal) on atti-
tudes while negative emotions should enhance the impact of negatively
valenced arguments (i.e., contra-arguments focusing negative consequences).
Finally, we are interested in how cognitive and affective influences on
judgments change in the course of the campaign. The longitudinal perspective
is employed because cognitive priming effects are generally assumed to mani-
fest themselves in an increasing impact of the primed content over time (e.g.,
Krosnick & Kinder, 1990; Ladd, 2007). We are thus proposing that the in-
fluence of the issue-related arguments on judgment should increase in the
course of the campaign. In addition, we advance the research question,
whether the interactive effects of emotion and cognition do increase over
time. This question is important as laboratory experiments have mainly
focused on the swift and presumably short-lived effects of affective priming
(cf. Forgas, 1995). In analogy to cognitive priming, one might assume that
repeated and consonant affective responses towards a political candidate or an
issue may chronically prime affect-congruent cognitions and thus strengthen
the interaction between emotion and cognition over time. Having said that, the
volatility of affective responses towards an attitude object may also undermine
any cumulative effect, which should be reflected in a more or less stable
interactive relationship over time.
Methods
Context and Data
Our analyses focus on a Swiss popular vote that was held on a reform of the
corporate taxation in 2008. The proposal was completed by the Federal
Council in 2005 and was approved by the Swiss parliament during 2006
and 2007. In March 2007 a referendum was requested by the Swiss people
which resulted in the popular vote of 2008 and, eventually, in the acceptance
of the proposal. Pivotal properties of the reform package were the mitigation
of double taxation of dividends, the reduction of capital tax, and the tax relief
on small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). To test our assumption,
we used survey data from a two-wave panel survey (n1¼ 1251, n2¼ 1001).
The first wave was fielded in the beginning of the campaign (in early January
2008), the second wave just after the ballot had taken place (in late February
2008). Response rate 1, calculated according to the American Association for
Public Opinion Research standard definitions (2009) is 14.4%, response rate 2
is 16.8%. The relatively low response rates may be ascribed to the high
complexity of the corporate taxation issue which might have discouraged
participation in the survey. This is backed up by the fact that 40% of all
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refusals were based on lack of interest in the issue. It should be noted, how-
ever, that response rates have been shown to be only weakly associated with
demographic representativeness (e.g., Holbrook, Krosnick, & Pfent, 2008).
That is, the low response rate may only pose a minor problem for the gen-
eralizability of empirical findings.
Measures and Analysis
Using computer-assisted telephone interviewing, participants were asked
which arguments in favor of and against the reform they approved and
what emotions towards the reform they experienced.1 Approval of the central
arguments (e.g., ‘‘This tax reform advances investments and creates new
jobs,’’ ‘‘This tax reform brings unacceptable tax losses for the federal govern-
ment and the cantons’’) was measured using 5-point rating scales (1 ‘‘do not
agree at all’’ to 5 ‘‘totally agree’’).
Similarly, to measure positive and negative emotions, participants were
asked to indicate how much they agreed with statements describing emotional
reactions towards the reform (e.g., ‘‘I am angry that income from investment
of capital is privileged over earned income,’’ ‘‘I am happy that the tax reform
solves a major problem for SMEs’’). That is, the emotional indicators asked
the participants if certain aspects of the reform are associated with positive or
negative emotions. A two-dimensional measurement of emotion was chosen
because it has been demonstrated that individuals may experience both posi-
tive and negative emotions towards the same politician or political issue (e.g.,
Abelson et al., 1982; Conover & Feldman, 1986). This may be particularly
true in the present case, as the corporate taxation reform features various
aspects that may be associated with different emotional reactions. The
two-dimensional structure of emotion is supported by the confirmatory
factor analysis we conducted (cf. next section).
It should be noted that our measures of argument approval are purely
cognitive as they address certain beliefs about the reform (e.g., ‘‘This tax
reform advances investments and creates new jobs’’). Admittedly, they exhibit
an evaluative component, but evaluation is not identical to affect. In fact,
cognitions as well as affect may exhibit an evaluative component (Eagly &
Chaiken, 1993) and affective priming effects even require that cognitions
exhibit a certain valence or evaluative meaning. The evaluative nature of a
measure hence does not imply that the measure is affective. According to
1Means and standard deviations in wave 2 are: Age (M¼ 48.59, SD¼ 16.59), left-right-ideology
(M¼ 6.16, SD¼ 2.13), satisfaction with income (M¼ 4.07, SD¼ 0.89), interest in tax reform (M¼ 3.82,
SD¼ 1.05), pro argument approval (M¼ 3.46, SD¼ 1.09), contra argument approval (M¼ 2.88, SD¼ 1.13),
positive emotion (M¼ 3.32, SD¼ 1.12), negative emotion (M¼ 3.76, SD¼ 1.13).
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Wyer, Clore, & Isbell (1999) ‘‘affect refers to the positively or negatively
valenced subjective reactions that a person experiences at a given point in
time. These reactions are experienced as either pleasant or unpleasant
feelings.’’ (p. 3). That is, affective evaluations are conveyed through experi-
enced feelings. Cognitive evaluations, on the other hand, are semantically
conveyed. Accordingly, our affective measures ask the respondents if they
experience an emotional reaction with regard to the corporate taxation
reform (e.g., ‘‘I am angry that income from investment of capital is privileged
over earned income’’). There may be some overlap between the cognitive and
affective indicators, but it must be stressed that they are not redundant with
regards to content. Individuals may, for instance, think that the tax reform will
entail tax losses without being emotionally concerned about them. To test the
construct validity of our affective and cognitive measures, we conducted a
confirmatory factor analysis using AMOS 18. Approval of pro and contra
arguments, as well as positive and negative emotions were modeled as four
latent variables. The results are depicted in Figure 1.
The model shows a good fit to the data: 2 (12)¼ 18.75, ns, comparative
fit index¼ .997, root mean square error of approximation¼ .024, p value
for test of close fit¼ .985, standardized root mean square residual¼ .016. As
expected, positive and negative emotions are negatively correlated. Similarly,
pro and contra arguments exhibit a negative relationship. However, the mod-
erate level of the within-cognition and within-emotion associations suggests
that neither cognitions nor emotions are bipolar constructs. Of special interest
are the relations between argument approval and experienced emotions: There
Figure 1
Confirmatory factor model for emotions and arguments in wave 1. All coefficients are significant on a
significance level of p< .001
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are considerable associations between arguments and emotions. Experiencing
positive emotions is positively correlated with the approval of pro arguments
and negatively correlated with the approval of contra arguments. Similarly,
negative emotions are positively associated with contra argument approval and
negatively related to pro argument approval. The confirmatory factor analysis
hence supports the notion that emotions and arguments are related but
discrete constructs. The results are in line with previous findings on the
structure of political cognition and emotion (e.g., Breckler & Wiggins, 1991;
Ottati et al., 1992).
For the regression analyses, the singular argument and emotion indicators
were combined into four mean indices for each wave (pro and contra argument
approval, positive and negative emotions towards the reform). All computed
indices exhibit a fair reliability.2 To test for interactive effects of emotions and
cognitions, two interaction terms were computed for each wave by multiplying
the pro argument index with the positive emotion index and the contra argu-
ment index with the negative emotion index. In addition, curvilinear effects
were controlled by adding squares of the argument and emotion indices into
the regression. This approach was employed because omitted curvilinear
relationships can lead to spurious interactions or obscure true interactions
when the constitutive indicators of the interactions are correlated (as it is
the case here) (Ganzach, 1997). All indices were mean-centered prior to com-
puting the interactions and the quadratic terms to alleviate the interpretation
of the results.3 It should be noted that we found no evidence for excessive
multicollinearity. The variance inflation factors for all argument and emotion
indices and their combinations showed values ranging between 1.3 and 3.0.
Thus, the critical threshold of 10.0 (Cohen, Cohen, West, & Aiken, 2003) was
not exceeded.
The dependent variable ‘‘global evaluation of the corporate taxation
reform’’ was measured by asking participants to report their agreement
with the statement ‘‘I am in favor of tax reliefs for business enterprises’’
(10-point rating scale, 1 ‘‘do not agree’’ to 10 ‘‘completely agree’’). The ques-
tion wording was: ‘‘We would now like to know what you are thinking
about the issue of corporate taxation reform in general.’’ That is, we instructed
individuals to report their overall attitude toward the reform. As the ques-
tion wording did not refer to specific aspects of the reform (i.e., specific
arguments) or emotional experiences, the measure is purely evaluative
2Reliabilities in waves 1 and 2 are: Pro arguments (w1¼ .75; w2¼ .82), contra arguments (w1¼ .59;
w2¼ .68), positive emotion (w1¼ .69; w2¼ .80), negative emotion (w1¼ .67; w2¼ .71).
3As the regression analyses contain interaction terms, the ‘‘main’’ effects of the centered predictors may
be interpreted as the average effect of the predictors across all values of the respective moderator (cf. Cohen,
Cohen, West, & Aiken, 2003).
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(cf. Eagly & Chaiken, 1993; Haddock et al., 1993). Identical measures of global
evaluation have been employed in various studies in the fields of public opin-
ion and attitude research (e.g., Abelson et al., 1982; Haddock et al., 1993;
Kim, Han, & Scheufele, 2010).
In addition, several covariates were measured with single items: Sex, age,
education, left–right orientation, satisfaction with income, and interest in the
tax reform. The data were analyzed using moderated hierarchical linear re-
gression analyses. For each wave, we successively entered covariates, approval
of pro and contra arguments, and positive and negative emotions towards the
reform as predictors of the global evaluation of the taxation package into the
regression. Finally, the four squares and two interactions of the argument and
emotion indices were entered into the models. Estimating a regression model
for each wave enabled us to investigate the changing impact of our predictors
on the attitude toward the corporate taxation reform over time. By comparing
the regression weights of predictors between waves, we follow a standard
procedure in priming research (Bartels, 2006; Krosnick & Kinder, 1990;
Ladd, 2007).
Following the regression analyses, we probed the interactions to achieve a
better understanding of their form with the MODPROBE macro (Hayes &
Matthes, 2009). The macro allows for the identification of the direction and
the significance of an independent variable’s regression coefficient at different
levels of the moderator (i.e., the complete range of values the moderator
actually takes). In other words, we took a look at the influence of argument
approval on issue evaluation at different levels of emotional reaction towards
the tax reform.
Results
Results for the two hierarchical regression analyses are shown in Table 1.4
Depicted are the results of the final regression after the entry of all variables
and the incremental R2 for each block of variables. Inspecting the covariates,
the results suggest that socio-demographic variables did not significantly affect
the global evaluation of the issue before or after the vote. Left–right ideology,
on the other hand, has a significant impact in both waves. Individuals who
located themselves on the right wing supported the tax reform more strongly
than left-wing individuals—a suggestive result considering tax reliefs were a
pivotal component of the reform. In wave 2, interest in the tax reform
4A comparison of the respondents and non-respondents of wave 2 showed no substantial differences. In
wave 1, the two groups did not differ with respect to their level of positive or negative emotions, approval of
pro or contra arguments or support of the corporate taxation reform. However, non-respondents were on
average younger than respondents (42 vs. 52 years) and were more often working full time (58 vs. 39%).
This implies that non-response was probably not associated with a certain opinion about the taxation
reform, but with the available time resources of the respondent.
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increased approval of the reform package, whereas satisfaction with income
reduced approval. Altogether, political predispositions accounted for 13.7%
and 13.6% of variance in waves 1 and 2 respectively.
Our first hypothesis posits that emotions and argument approval
should exert distinct influences on issue evaluation (direct affective impact).
The regression analyses support this notion. As expected, the approval of
arguments regarding business benefits increases support for the reform pack-
age in both waves, whereas approval of contra arguments has an adverse effect.
Similarly, positive emotions towards the reform increase support, whereas
Table 1
Hierarchical Regression Analyses of Evaluation of Corporate Taxation Reform
Predictors Wave 1 Wave 2
B  B 
Block 1: Demographics
Sex (1¼male, 2¼ female) .034 .007 .057 .012
Age .000 .001 .006 .040
Education .005 .007 .006 .009
Block 2: Political predispositions
Left–right ideology (1¼ left, 10¼ right) .191** .171** .104* .098*
Satisfaction with income .012 .004 .190* .070*
Interest in tax reform .026 .011 .194* .088*
Block 3: Arguments
Business benefits (pro arguments) .421** .190** .478** .226**
Tax losses (contra arguments) .183* .085* .118# .058#
Block 4: Emotions
Positive emotions towards reform .621** .274** .506** .246**
Negative emotions towards reform .245* .116* .239* .117*
Block 5: Quadratic terms
Pro arguments (squared) .174* .105* .079 .048
Contra arguments (squared) .056 .034 .130* .081*
Positive emotions (squared) .011 .007 .070 .044
Negative emotions (squared) .010 .007 .044 .031
Block 6: Interactions
Positive emotions pro arguments .026 .015 .181* .100*
Negative emotions contra arguments .031 .017 .116* .070*
Block 1 Incremental R2 .005 .004
Block 2 Incremental R2 .137** .136**
Block 3 Incremental R2 .119** .132**
Block 4 Incremental R2 .058** .044**
Block 5 Incremental R2 .008* .015**
Block 6 Incremental R2 .000 .006*
Total R2Adjusted .315 .326
Note. B values and s refer to the final coefficients after the entry of all variables.
#p< .10, *p< .05, **p< .001.
A F F E C T I V E P R I M I N G I N P O L I T I C A L C A M P A I G N S 497
negative emotions decrease support. Interestingly, emotions turn out to be
better predictors of issue evaluation than argument approval. In both waves,
the beta coefficients of positive and negative emotions are higher than the beta
coefficients for the approval of pro and contra arguments. Furthermore,
it should be noted that pro arguments and positive emotions are better
predictors of issue evaluation than contra arguments and negative emotions.
We will address this finding in the discussion section.
Our results support the hypothesis that people’s affective reactions directly
influence political judgments. The findings also provide evidence of direct
affective influences that are independent of the impact of cognitions and
even stronger than the cognitive effects. Obviously, voters relied more on
their feelings than on their cognitive beliefs when evaluating the corporate
taxation reform. This result is in line with findings in previous studies that
emotions can directly inform political judgments (e.g., Abelson et al., 1982;
Haddock & Zanna, 1998).
It should also be noted that we found some evidence for curvilinear effects
of emotion and cognition on issue evaluation (see Table 1, block 5). More
precisely, the linear effects of emotion and cognition were sometimes accom-
panied by some degree of convexity. However, in the absence of any hypoth-
eses about quadratic effects, we will confine the further discussion to the
theoretically postulated interaction effects and treat the quadratic terms as
mere covariates, employed to preclude spurious or suppressed interactions
of emotion and cognition.
To test for the moderation of argument approval’s attitudinal influence
by emotion (affective priming), we entered the interaction terms in the last
block of the regression. The interaction between pro argument approval
and positive emotion had a significant impact on issue evaluation in wave 2.
The positive sign of the term implies that the positive effects of the pro
arguments on evaluation increase when participants experience strong positive
emotions. To gain a better understanding of the interaction, we plotted the
size of the pro arguments’ regression coefficient against the values of
the moderator (i.e., the positive emotion index). The results are depicted in
Figure 2.
Depicted are the areas of significance and non-significance that denote at
which values of the moderator the pro arguments have a significant impact on
the evaluation of the tax reform. As can be seen, pro arguments have no
influence on evaluation when individuals experienced only faint positive emo-
tions. As positive affect increases, however, the attitudinal impact of the pro
arguments grows steadily. More precisely, pro arguments have a significant
effect for individuals whose measurement of positive emotion is less than 1.20
scale points below the empirical mean (i.e., for 80% of the sampled
individuals).
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The interaction between contra arguments and negative emotion on issue
evaluation is significant in the second wave too. Contra arguments influence
the evaluation of the reform proposal only when negative emotion is at least
0.167 scale points above the empirical mean (i.e., for 56% of the sampled indi-
viduals). Thus, contra arguments only have an influence on the attitude towards
the tax proposal when individuals experienced relatively strong negative affect.
Our affective priming hypothesis is hence supported for wave 2.
Finally, we were interested in how the impact of cognitions and emotions
changes over time. In terms of cognitive priming, one expects that the
Figure 2
Size of the regression coefficient for pro arguments (with 95% confidence interval) plotted against
empirical values of the moderator (positive emotions) in wave 2
Figure 3
Size of the regression coefficient for contra arguments (with 95% confidence interval) plotted against
empirical values of the moderator (negative emotions) in wave 2
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attitudinal impact of cognitions increases in the course of the campaign. As
Table 1 shows, the impact of pro and contra arguments grows only marginally
from wave 1 to wave 2: The amount of variance explained by the arguments
rises from 11.9 to 13.2%. However, significance tests of the differences be-
tween the regression coefficients did not indicate any significant increase.
A different picture emerges when we consider the change in the cognitive–
affective interaction terms from the first to the second panel wave. In the first
wave, neither interaction is statistically significant. In the second wave, the
interaction between pro arguments and positive emotions as well as the
interaction between contra arguments and negative emotions is significant.
That is, affective priming effects are only found in the end of the campaign.
Accordingly, significance tests indicate that the two interaction terms signifi-
cantly increased over time (p< .05). All in all, we found no clear evidence for
cognitive priming, but were able to demonstrate cumulative affective priming.
Apparently, the political campaign did not successively prime people’s
cognitive beliefs, but evoked positive and negative emotions that increasingly
activated arguments regarding the reform.
Discussion
The present study clearly shows that emotions can both directly and indirectly
influence people’s attitude towards proposals like the corporate taxation
reform. The finding is particularly intriguing as emotions exerted a substantial
direct effect on the evaluation of the corporate taxation reform (see Table 1,
block 4), even though the issue was quite dry, technical and, at first glance,
unlikely to provoke intense emotional reactions. Having said that, the com-
plexity of the proposal might just have facilitated affective influences.
Participants may have relied on their feelings because the complexity of the
proposal hindered them to integrate the pivotal arguments into a coherent
opinion. This interpretation is suggestive as the affect-as-information approach
postulates the use of the affect heuristic whenever an individual is not moti-
vated or—due to cognitive restraints—not able to elaborate available informa-
tion (cf. Forgas, 1995; Schwarz & Clore, 1983). The high complexity of
the tax issue is also the most likely reason why emotions exerted a stronger
influence on the evaluation of the reform package than argument approval (see
Table 1, blocks 3 and 4). When people are not motivated and/or not able to
comprehend a political issue, the attitudinal impact of the affect heuristic
should increase because their emotions may be the only reliable and intelligible
source of information. At the same time, the influence of arguments which the
majority of the electorate does not understand should diminish because
the issue complexity impedes a rational weighing of these arguments.
Consequently, emotions should have a substantial impact on the evaluation
of an overly complex issue.
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Interestingly, positive information (i.e., pro arguments and positive emo-
tions) had a bigger impact on the evaluation of the reform than negative
information (see Table 1, blocks 3 and 4). This result is contrary to a bulk
of studies which indicate a negativity bias in judgment formation (e.g., Peeters
& Czapinski, 1990). However, it has been argued that the relationship between
a valenced message and judgment is mediated by the informativeness of the
message. That is, positive information can be more influential during judg-
ment formation if it is more diagnostic for a judgment (e.g., Skowronski &
Carlston, 1989). In the corporate taxation campaign, pro arguments may have
been perceived as more informative as they addressed direct consequences
of the reform package (e.g., the advancement of investments and creation of
new jobs). The arguments that were brought forward by the contra camp, on
the other hand, focused on consequences that are more indirect and remote
(e.g., potential negative long-term effects for the social insurance system).
That is, the arguments of the pro camp may have been more persuasive as they
addressed immediate instead of alleged long-term consequences of the reform.
The stronger influence of positive emotions is in line with findings on
the asymmetrical effects of positive and negative emotion on judgment.
According to this, positive affect triggers heuristic processing, whereas nega-
tive affect promotes systematic processing (e.g., Schwarz & Clore, 1983).
Positive affect is thus more likely to be used as a judgment heuristic and
may have more pronounced (direct) effects on opinion formation than negative
affect. Similarly, the affective intelligence approach posits that enthusiasm
instructs individuals to pay little attention to political events and rely on
shortcuts (Marcus & MacKuen, 1993). Political campaigns may hence promote
or impede detailed examination of information by inducing positive or nega-
tive emotions which has also implications for the impact of emotions on
judgment.
Extending previous findings of public opinion research on the direct
effects of emotions, we were also able to find support for the affective priming
hypothesis: Positive and negative emotions increased the impact of similarly
valenced arguments on judgment—albeit only in the end of the campaign (see
Table 1, block 6). More specifically, positive emotions raised the importance
of pro arguments for the attitude towards the tax proposal. Similarly, negative
emotions increased the attitudinal impact of contra arguments. This result
makes clear that emotions do not only directly inform voters about their
preferences. They also have an indirect effect on attitudes by increasing the
accessibility of affect-congruent beliefs during opinion formation. This result
goes beyond findings of previous survey studies and corroborates evidence
provided by experimental studies (e.g., Bower & Forgas, 2001).
The plots of the interactions revealed a surprising picture: Some level of
positive and negative emotional activation was necessary in order that the pro
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and contra arguments could exert their impact on the evaluation of the reform
package (see Figures 2 and 3). Campaigns are thus able to affectively prime
the use of certain arguments which might not be used by voters otherwise. It
is open to discussion how such affective priming effects are evaluated in the
light of the demands of democratic deliberation. We may interpret this affect-
ive priming effect positively as emotions may enable individuals to draw from
their knowledge reservoirs facilitating a political judgment about a difficult
issue like the tax proposal. On the other hand, this finding may be criticized as
the result of manipulative emotionalized communication. Whatever position is
favored, it is apparent that emotionalized communication is a powerful tool for
political campaigners. Our findings implicate that political campaigns should
be particularly effective when they communicate arguments in favor of one’s
own position and elicit congruent emotions towards the issue. Proponents of
an issue should, for instance, be interested in communicating pro arguments
and eliciting positive emotions. The latter should not only directly increase the
evaluation of the issue at hand but also indirectly enhance the impact of the
pro arguments.
We also found evidence for cumulative affective priming effects: Emotions
primed arguments only in the end of the campaign (see Table 1, block 6).
The results bridge experimental findings on affective priming with survey
studies on opinion formation in political campaigns. Experimental studies
have repeatedly demonstrated that affect may influence the accessibility of
cognitions. Our findings show, in addition, that individual and for that
matter rather weak affective priming effects may add up during the course
of a campaign. This, in turn, can produce a chronic accessibility of
affect-congruent arguments. Thus, affective priming is presumably an effect
that requires a certain time frame to build up. Individual affective priming
effects are unlikely to have a lasting effect on cognition. Rather, a repeated
induction of emotions is necessary to increase the chronic accessibility of
affect-congruent cognitions.
Finally, we have to address some limitations of this study. First, one might
object that the identified affective priming effects demonstrated are rather
weak. With less than 1% of explained variance the affective priming effect
appears negligible. It should however be noted that owing to methodological
constraints interactive effects are especially hard to identify in survey designs
and even effects explaining only small quantities of variance should be
considered as important (McClelland & Judd, 1993; Morris, Sherman &
Mansfield, 1986). Furthermore, when we consider the result of the referen-
dum, then even this small effect might have had considerable consequences.
The tax proposal received only a small majority of 50,5% of the votes. In this
close run, affective priming effects might have been the crucial factor in
deciding the vote.
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Second, we were not able to find substantive evidence for the generally
well corroborated campaign priming effects. The amount of variance explained
by cognitive beliefs (i.e., the approval of arguments) only increased marginally.
How can the missing effects be explained and reconciled with the previous
findings on campaign priming? On the one hand, it should be noted that the
interval between the panel waves was rather short. The first wave took place
in early January and the second wave in the end of February. Compared with
the interpanel intervals of several months in American National Election
Studies, this time lag might have been too short to produce stronger cognitive
priming effects. On the other hand, as has been already argued, the corporate
taxation reform might have been too complicated to be understood by the
people. Its complexity might have impeded learning processes which may be
the reason for the relative stability of argument approval’s impact on the
attitude towards the proposal.
Finally, our findings on cumulative affective priming effects have to be
discussed. The question if affective priming effects are cumulative or not, is
probably an empirical issue. Cumulative effects are expected when a politician
or issue repeatedly evokes consonant affective reactions so that the singular
priming instances can add up and augment the chronic accessibility of
affect-congruent cognitions. Cumulative effects might be inhibited, on the
other hand, if the emotional reactions towards a political object vary in the
course of a campaign. Further studies are needed to establish the conditions
under which affective priming effects occur and are expected to consolidate
over time. A closer look at the dynamics of a campaign should prove to be
useful as the affective primes of a conflictive campaign might cancel each other
out while consonant primes might reinforce each other. Furthermore, individ-
ual differences should be considered. Several possible moderators of affective
influence like the cognitive abilities and motivation of the individual to process
information have already been addressed in the previous sections and their
impact is well documented in experimental studies (cf. Forgas, 1995; Schwarz
& Clore, 1983). As Forgas (1995) points out, for instance, direct and indirect
influences of emotions on evaluations are linked to the depth of information
processing which is used to form an opinion. This examination of the condi-
tions of affective influences on political judgments is particularly important as
it may shed light on the classical question if and when emotions are detri-
mental or beneficial for political decision making.
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